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Abstract 
The roles of the flag state in maritime security have recently been increasing due to the escalation of maritime 
security threats caused by non-state actors such as piracy, armed robbery against ships, illegal fishing, and 
marine environment degradation. The nexus between maritime security and flag states is very strong. This is 
because flag states have exclusive jurisdiction over ships flying their flags and ships are the primary tool used in 
all non-state maritime security threats. This study investigates the possibility of the East African Community 
(EAC) utilising its flag states to cover up the existing maritime safety and security governance gap in the region. 
While that could be possible, the EAC lacks the necessary legal and institutional frameworks to do so. The study 
intends to encourage the EAC Secretariat and the politicians among the EAC member states on the importance of 
aligning civilian institutions such as maritime authorities with other maritime law enforcement agencies against 
regional maritime security threats.  
Keywords: Maritime security governance; East African Community; Flag state 
 
1. Introduction 
The EAC is an intergovernmental organisation (IGO). It currently comprises the states of Burundi, Kenya, 
Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Kenya and Tanzania are the only coastal states of the Community; 
the rest are landlocked. In its current state, the EAC is not a federation. However, according to Article 5(2) of the 
EAC Treaty, the ultimate goal of the Community is to have a federal government (EAC Treaty, 1999). Until then, 
the EAC cannot be a flag state. It however, has some authoritative powers over the regional flag states of Kenya 
and Tanzania. That is a link where the EAC could take a leading role or at least consultative role in regional 
maritime safety and security.  
Flag state is a professional term used to describe the process of the registration of commercial ships; a 
country that allows ships to fly its flag is known as a flag state (Mansell, 2010). A flag state has an overall 
responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of international maritime safety and security regulations 
for all ships granted the right to fly its flag (UNCLOS, Art. 94; Mansell, 2010). A flag state is one of the 
important coastal state institutions, dedicated to the civilian roles of maritime security. It is important to 
appreciate that flag state and Port State Controls (PSC) are important parts of the maritime authorities’ broad 
responsibilities. The maritime security roles of a flag state have been broadened significantly in recent years to 
include maritime security governance in collaboration with other law enforcement agencies of coastal states.  
The EAC as one of the eight recognised Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs) has a 
responsibility to protect its maritime domain including inland waters for security and economic welfare of its 
citizens as advocated by the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIMS). Unfortunately, the EAC 
has so far turned a blind eye to its own regional maritime security governance. The issue of maritime security 
governance has been left entirely with the individual coastal states, Kenya and Tanzania. At the Community 
level, the EAC has no specific roles in regional maritime security.  Within the EAC, there is an excessive 
perception that maritime security governance is an exclusive role of navy and therefore maritime security nexus 
state sovereignty.  While that might be true, there are some maritime security issues where roles of civilian 
institutions such as flag state are significant high. The EAC is no exception to that notion. Maritime security 
threats such as piracy, armed robbery against ships, human trafficking, illegal fishing and marine environmental 
degradation are predomiantely affecting the EAC maritime domain  (Very, 2013) and are within the juridictions 
of civilian instituions including flag states of Kenya and Tanzania. 
This study explores the flag state administrations of the EAC and how they contribute to regional 
maritime security governance. It also looks at whether the EAC could do more to strengthen its maritime 
security governance through the use of those regional flag states. The study starts by conceptualising the flag 
state and providing an overview of the EAC’s maritime security governance, following this with an investigation 
into how the EAC could take a leading role in regional maritime security. The study continues by examining the 
role of the EAC’s flag states in regional maritime security and ends with a conclusion.  
 
2. Flag states in context 
Flag state is a professional term used to describe the process of registration of commercial ships; a country that 
allows ships to fly its flag is then known as a flag state (Mansell, 2010, pp. 18-19). For that reason, the flag a 
ship flies legally indicates its nationality (UNCLOS, Art. 91). Once a certain ship is documented and registered 
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is allowed to fly a Tanzanian flag, for example, it becomes a Tanzanian ship, regardless of where it belongs or 
who owns it. A ship like a citizen holds a nationality. In the international customary law, this nationality is 
absolutely essential for the ship to sail on the high seas (Coles & Watt, 2009). A ships with no particular 
nationality, is regarded as a stateless ship. Equally, it enjoys no protection on the high seas and will be denied 
access to foreign ports; eventually the ship will not be able to trade internationally (Coles & Watt, 2009).  
In today’s world, the stateless ship suffers even more and severe consequences by being regarded as a 
criminal’s ship that tries to evade jurisdictions (Klein, 2011). Because the high seas are for all mankind including 
landlocked states and out of any state’s jurisdiction reach (UNCLOS, Art. 87); therefore, ships sailing on the 
high seas fall exclusively to their flag state’s jurisdiction (UNCLOS, Art. 94). The world’s commercial fleet 
consisted of 89,464 vessels; with a total tonnage of 1.75 billion dwt (UNCTAD, 2015, p. 30). The fleet is 
registered in over 150 nations and is manned by over a million seafarers of virtually every nationality (IMO, 
2015). The Tanzanian flag, for example, holds approximately 0.67% of the total world tonnage (UNCTAD, 2015, 
p. 42).  
The legislation of states for registration of commercial ships is divided into three categories. These are 
a closed registry, an open registry and a second registry.  
 
2.1 Closed registry:  
Closed registry or traditional registry as it used be known, is the one registered in the ship’s homeland and fly a 
local flag (Coles & Watt, 2009). Close registries typically require a ship be owned and constructed by national 
interests, and at least partially crewed by its citizens.   
 
2.2 Open registry: 
Open registration is the process of allowing foreign owned ships to fly a national flag for some genuine reasons 
(Egiyan, 1990). These reasons might be to obtain some business opportunities and economy in shipping 
operations. Through savings in the shipping overhead costs, would eventually make the shipping companies 
competitive in the industry and eventual boosting their private revenue. Open registration offer potential on 
economic benefits for both open registry states and ship-owners. Economic benefits to a state operating open 
registry could be realised in the following ways: tonnage taxes and registration fees; franchise and/or royalty 
fees; and reduced government expense due to outsourcing.  
However, if the flagging-out reason is for evading international shipping standards, then the process 
turns to be the flag of convenience. Flag of convenience (FOC) is a nickname for the open registry. In fact it’s 
allegedly considered as a dark side of the open registry. There are some paradoxes however as to whether the 
open registry and FOC carry the same meaning and where exactly a line can be drawn between the two (Egiyan, 
1990). However, that discussion is out of scope of this study and will not be extended. Nonetheless, FOCs are 
notoriously known for their ignorance of international maritime norms and therefore are regarded as part of 
broad maritime security problems posed by ships. More importantly, FOCs have repeatedly being seen engaging 
in illegal fishing and marine degradation.    
 
2.3 Second Registry:  
A second registry is an intermediate version of ship registry that lies between a national (closed) registry and an 
open registry. Second registries or international registries as they sometime used to be known may be described 
as “registries that allow for use of the national flag, albeit under conditions which are different for those 
applicable for the first national registry” (Tanaka, 2015, p. 162). Flag states maintain second registries 
simultaneously with their closed registries in attempt to claim back their national fleets that have been flagged 
out to open registries. The second registry is also aimed at encouraging ship owners not to flag out by offering 
them slightly relaxed regulations compared to a closed registry. These include some tax reliefs and more 
importantly less employment restrictions. Eventually, under second registries, foreign crews could be employed 
at international wages (Carlise, 2009).  
The shipping industry is the most highly competitive and globalised industry of all, yet it is an 
undeniable fact that it is also one of the highly regulated industries. For that reason, ship owners have flexibility 
to choose where to register their vessels based on cost, convenience and the international and domestic 
regulations that would govern their operations (Goodman, 2009). Nevertheless, this freedom is sometimes 
abused and somehow ship owners end up in the hands of flag states that are incapable of enforcing international 
and national jurisdictions over their ships. Once again, these failed flag states are what are referred to as the 
FOCs (Mansell, 2010).  
 
3. Role of the EAC in regional maritime security 
Maritime security governance, at its most simple, relates to all measures a country or a region as a whole takes to 
prevent unlawful acts in the maritime Domain (Gilipin, 2007).  The issue of maritime security governance has 
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been left entirely with the individual coastal states, Kenya and Tanzania. At the Community level, the EAC has 
very limited roles in regional maritime security. That is due to the lack of legal and institutional frameworks to 
support regional maritime affairs including maritime security. More importantly, the EAC does not have a 
maritime security strategy which would have formalised the regional maritime security governance and 
cooperation.  
There is also a strong sense that maritime security nexus state sovereignty.  While that might be true in 
hard maritime security issues such those relating to state’s maritime borders and maritime terrorism which are an 
exclusive role of navy; roles of civilian institutions in softy maritime security issues are significant. The roles of 
flag states in softy maritime security issues such as marine environment, human and drags trafficking and illegal 
fishing, for example, are very important. The EAC is not exceptional to this, the flag states of Kenya and 
Tanzania are the ones playing a big role in the region maritime security governance, only downside they are 
doing it unilaterally.  
 
4. Survey of Flag states of the EAC: Can they form a unified flag state? 
The EAC is not yet a federation. For that reason, each of its six members has its own flag state administration. 
Only Kenya and Tanzania have flag states whose meanings fit the context of this study. This is because they are 
coastal states, IMO state parties, have ships on the seas and have ratified a good number of international 
maritime conventions. These conditions are absolutely essential for a country to run a flag state. The EAC’s 
landlocked states have some ships on rivers and lakes; none of them has any ship on the seas. According to 
Article 90 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), landlocked states can be flag 
states and sail ships on the high seas through their own flags (UNCLOS, Art. 94).  However, that would require 
landlocked states to have the necessary jurisdictions and capacity to put ships on the high seas in the first place. 
None of the EAC’s landlocked states appears to have such capacity at the moment.  
 
4.1 Kenya 
Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA) is an official flag state of Kenya. As of January 2015, there were nine 
Kenyan flagged ships on sea of 19,000 dwt (UNCTAD, 2015, p. 35).  The Kenyan fleet comprises tugs and 
pontoons mostly working in the Kenyan internal waters. The fleet is predominately owed by the Kenyan 
government. For that reason, the fleet fall under non-SOLAS vessels category. According to SOLAS XI-2 and 
ISPS Code, SOLAS vessels are a) passenger ship of any size that is engaging on international voyage and b) 
cargo ships of 500 GT and upward that is engaging on international voyage. There are three Kenyan flagged 
ships in the Lake Victoria of 2,200 dwt. Kenya register ships through the Merchant Shipping Act of 2009 as 
amended in 2012. Kenyan Railway Corporation has also some mandates to register ships in inland waters. The 
Merchant Shipping Act of Kenya does not allow for international registration. This is one of the reason why 
Kenya it does not have an international registry. In addition to ratifying the UNCLOS and Maritime Labour 
Convention (MLC), Kenya has already ratified 33 IMO’s conventions.  
 
4.2 United Republic of Tanzania (URT) and its the dual-flag system  
The URT has a dual-flag-state system. The dual-flag-state system in the URT is the result of a union taking the 
form of a two-tier governance system instead of a federation. The URT is a union of two sovereign states, 
formally made in 1964 between the (then) Republic of Tanganyika and the People’s Republic of Zanzibar. The 
union was not meant to be all-encompassing; it only deals with specific matters known as “union matters”, of 
which maritime affairs is not one. As a result, flag state administration as an important part of the URT’s 
maritime affairs, has been seriously affected by the two-tier governance system. For that reason, the URT finds 
itself with two maritime administrations using two different sets of maritime law. Eventually, in the URT, there 
are two flag states, two local ships’ registries and one international ships’ registry, all of which fly the same URT 
flag. Notably, one of these flag states is under the Tanzania Mainland maritime administration, known as the 
Surface and Marine Transport Regulatory Authority (SUMATRA) and the other is run by the semi-autonomous 
islands of Zanzibar through the Zanzibar Maritime Authority (ZMA). 
4.2.1 The governance of the dual flag states in the URT 
Having two flag states and three registries in a single country has never been an easy task. With respect to local 
registries, the SUMATRA and the ZMA work largely in harmony through a high level of technical cooperation 
between themselves. However, the international registry is what poses many of the administrative, diplomatic 
and political problems within and outside the URT. The URT is the only body recognised by the IMO with 
respect to Tanzanian maritime affairs, but sadly it does not have a flag state of its own. Instead, the SUMATRA 
wears two hats by assuming both the URT’s role and that of Tanzania Mainland. To ease the situation, the URT, 
SUMATRA and ZMA, through IMO supervision, have all tacitly agreed to allow the SUMATRA to represent 
the URT (including Zanzibar) on all flag state issues that need international attention.  
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• Tanzania Mainland flag state 
The SUMATRA is Tanzania Mainland’s multi-sector regulatory agency established by Act of Parliament CAP 
413 to be a regulator of rail, road, ports and marine transport services. Because it is responsible for maritime 
transport services, it has become the flag state representing the URT and Tanzania Mainland. In executing its 
ship registration role, the SUMATRA uses the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act no. 21 of 2003. 
Currently, the local register at the SUMATRA does not have any SOLAS vessels (i.e. vessels of more than 500 
gt engaged on international voyages). About 58 per cent of its 97 vessels operate on inland waters and 42 per 
cent predominately operate within URT territorial waters (EAC, 2014). The average age of the Tanzanian 
Mainland fleet is approximately 30 years with a total tonnage of approximately 70,000 dwt. Tanzania has ratified 
21 IMO’s conventions in addition to the UNCLOS. Currently has not yet ratified MLC which is an important 
convention to support the seafarers’ welfares. 
• Zanzibar flag state 
The ZMA is specifically crafted to deal with the maritime transportation issues of Zanzibar. Since it does not 
deal with multi-sector tasks like the SUMATRA, it is therefore perceived to be more efficient than its mainland 
counterpart. The ZMA came into force on 30 March 2009 through the Zanzibar Maritime Authority Act no. 3 of 
2009. The ZMA uses the provisions of the Maritime Transport Act 2009 in all of its ships’ registration processes. 
Compared to the SUMATRA’s the Merchant Shipping Act that allows only local registry; the provisions of the 
Maritime Transport Act allow the ZMA to run both a local and an international registry.  
• The local registry 
The Zanzibar-based local registry is known as the Tanzania Zanzibar Register of Shipping (TZRS). As of 
December 2014, the TZRS had 70 vessels having approximately 54,175.8 dwt in total (EAC, 2014). Despite 
having dual flag states and, of course, two local registries, the running of two local registries in the URT does not 
pose many serious problems. The two registries maintain very close cooperation on virtually everything relating 
to maritime safety and security, including technical cooperation. Since all the ships under the two local registries 
sail within Tanzanian maritime waters, the act of flying the same flag does not create any significant problems. 
However, this is absolutely impossible for the international registry. 
• The international registry 
In addition to the local registry, the ZMA operates the international registry, which is known as the Tanzania 
Zanzibar International Registry of Shipping (TZIRS). In 2015, TZIRS was named by UNCTAD’s review of 
maritime transport report as the world’s 23rd largest registry by tonnage and the second largest in Africa after 
Liberia’s (UNCTAD, 2015, p. 42).  As shown in Figure 1, by January 2015 the TZIRS had 1,313 ships, with 
11,773,000 dwt (data sourced from annual reports of 2012 to 2015). 
Figure 4. Tonnage movement in TZIRS registry, 2012–2015 
 
The evidence suggests that while the TZIRS tonnage increases, the flag quality is decreasing. For 
many years, the Tanzanian flag has been blacklisted and marked as being among the high-risk flags on every 
PSC regime. A lack of manpower capacity and excessive reliance on business agencies to run the flag have been 
pointed out as the main factors leading to the flag’s bad performance. The non-ratification of important maritime 
conventions such as the MLC is also a factor that undermines flag quality. To analyse the risk profile of the 
TZIRS, we decided to use the PSC regimes of Tokyo and Paris because they are using the same evaluation 
criteria (excess factor as risk factor), which allows good comparison. Table 1 shows the performance of the 
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Tanzanian flag as measured by the Paris and Tokyo MoU in the period of 2012 to 2014 (data sourced from 
annual reports of 2012 to 2014). 
 
 
The excess factor (EF) is used in PSC regimes to make flags’ performances comparable. The EF 
values indicate the approximate relations of the number of inspections and resultant detentions, as well as the 
risk profile of a specific flag ship. The higher the excess factor, the riskier the flag is. The statistics in Figure 2 
support the allegation that the TZIRS is one of the riskiest flags in the maritime world. On average, 24 per cent 
of TZIRS ships are detained on PSC inspections across the world. As previously explained, despite these 
deficiencies, the TZIRS is the second largest register in Africa after Liberia’s. Ship registration is a national 
pride and business too. It generates many jobs and earns foreign income for many developing countries. For 
example, the Liberian ship registry contributes about 5.1 per cent to national GDP (MoF, 2011). In the EAC’s 
shipping industry, ship registration in particular could be developed to realise the regional ambitions of the blue 
economy.  
Figure 5: % Inspection with detention of TZIRS, 2010–2015 
 
4.3 Is it possible for the EAC to form a unified flag state? 
An IGO such as the EAC does not qualify to be a flag state. In fact, there is no any IGO’s flag that serves as an 
official “ensign” on commercial ships in the world. This is because IGOs do not have a statehood qualification 
which is a flag state’s prerequisite condition. A flag state must be able to ratify and enforce international and 
regional maritime instruments on ships flying its flag. IGOs do not have such ratification and enforcement 
capabilities of their own, but rather serve as rule making bodies (Lillie, 2006). Despite the lack of statehood and 
enforcement capabilities, IGOs have powerful and influential position over its members when it comes to 
ratification of important international maritime conventions and their enforceability. Because of such influential 
powers they have, IGOs allowed to be IMO observatory members. The African Union (AU) and European 
Table 8: Tanzania PSC Performance on Paris and Tokyo 
MoU, 2012–2014 
Paris MoU Tokyo MoU 
2014 
Blacklisted   
High risk   
Excess factor  3 4.18 
        
2013 
Blacklisted   
High risk   
Excess factor 3.58 4.26 
        
2012 
Blacklisted   
High risk   
Excess factor 2.78 3.1 
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Union (EU) are the best examples of the IGOs that have IMO’s observatory members and a big impact on 
regional maritime governance.  Nevertheless, the AU and the EU cannot be flag states and there flags have never 
been flown on commercial ships as an official ensign.  
Under certain circumstances, such as a ship on a peace-keeping mission, a ship offering humanitarian 
assistance or a ship seeking protection and the like, Article 93 of the UNCLOS allows ships to fly the flags of the 
United Nations or its specialised agencies and other IGOs. A commercial ship may opt to fly the UN flag, for 
example, alongside its own flag or a UN flag alone. Whatever the case, the jurisdictions of that ship are always 
determined by its flag state. In 2004, for example, there were massive pressures for the EU to establish its own 
ship registry, which would allow its flag to be flown on commercial ships. The initiative was, however, rejected 
by the European Parliament because it was using the EU flag as an ‘ensign’ on commercial ships, which would 
contradict the provisions of Article 91 (1 and 2) of the UNCLOS (Schmöger, 2004). Article 91 insists that all 
ships have a particular nationality, which should be demonstrated through the flag that is flown by them. The EU 
had good reasons to reject this proposal because it is neither a state nor a supranational organisation.  
 
5. Roles of a flag state in maritime security: How does the EAC fit in? 
Traditionally, flag states’ roles were limited to ensuring the safety and security of ships flying their flag while on 
the high seas. In recent years, however, the nexus between flag state and maritime security has been expanded 
and become an important issue in the maritime world and, of course, international relations  (Hosanee, 2008).  
As argued by Goodman, the rights of flag states have remained largely unchanged since the original evolution of 
the concept  (Goodman, 2009, p. 157). But the list of their responsibilities has grown exponentially in areas 
ranging from ship safety standards and crew training to marine pollution, maritime security and seafarers’ 
welfare (Goodman, 2009). This is partly due to the escalation of the maritime security threats caused by non-
state actors, such as piracy, terrorism, illegal fishing, and the trafficking of narcotics, light weapons and humans. 
The criminals in these categories of maritime security threats use ships as either potential targets or a means to 
deliver their attacks. This suggests that most maritime crimes that take place at sea involve ships in one way or 
another. For this reason, flag states are taken as important institutions in the war against maritime security threats, 
at both the national and international levels  (Murphy, 2007). 
A flag state has an overall responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of international 
maritime regulations for all ships granted the right to fly its flag. However, that would require a flag state to have 
a maritime authority that is capable of executing those responsibilities, as stipulated by Article 94 of the 
UNCLOS. A flag state is required to “effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical 
and social matters over ships flying its flag” (UNCLOS, Art. 94).   It is further required to maintain a register of 
all the ships flying its flag, also assuming jurisdiction under its national law for both the ship and its crew in 
relation to administrative, technical and social matters. In addition to the general roles that flag states have under 
the UNCLOS, there are some specific roles relating to maritime security through a range of international 
maritime conventions. Some of these conventions are: MARPOL 73/78, for the marine environment; the SOLAS 
conventions for the safety of life at sea, including ship and port security; the SUA conventions for maritime 
terrorism; and the MLC for the welfare of seafarers and the like.  
The EAC’s flag states of Kenya and Tanzania are responsible for almost all the civilian maritime 
security of the region. Through their Merchant Shipping Acts, they are responsible for vigilance against maritime 
security threats such as piracy, armed robbery against ships, illegal fishing and marine environment degradation. 
The only downside is that the capability of these flag states to enforce those regulations is rather low. These flag 
states, for example, are the ones supposed to have coastguard (or equivalent) units for maritime law enforcement. 
Unfortunately, the region does not have a single coastguard unit. In the absence of coastguard units, regional 
navies assume both warfare and law enforcement roles. This is an overwhelming task for young navies, such as 
those of Kenya and Tanzania, given their assets and manpower capacities. Additionally, navies find it difficult to 
work with civilian institutions such as the KMA, the SUMATRA and the ZMA.  
Perhaps the biggest contribution of the KMA and the SUMATRA to regional maritime security 
governance comes in the form of maintaining information sharing centres (ISCs) at Mombasa, Kenya and Dar-
es-Salaam, Tanzania. The KMA and the SUMATRA operate the Regional Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre 
(RMRCC) in Mombasa, Kenya and the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) in Dar-es-Salaam, 
Tanzania (IMO, 2015). These ISCs serve as regional coordinators on search and rescue missions, as well as 
piracy ISCs. These centres make a big contribution to the war against piracy and armed robbery in the EAC and 
the wider region.  
Kenya and Tanzania are two of the 19 member states of the Indian Ocean Memorandum of 
Understanding (IOMOU). Table 3 shows that Kenyan and Tanzanian contributions to PSCs constitute 6 per cent 
of the total PSC inspections undertaken by the IOMOU from 2010 to 2015  (IOMoU, 2015).  As a region, 6 per 
cent is not a bad number given the number of ships calling. However, concerns surround the ability of Tanzania 
to undertaken PSC inspections. Tanzania has only conducted 3 per cent of the total inspections conducted in the 
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EAC region; the rest were carried out by Kenya. In those inspections, a total of 683 ships were found to have 
deficiencies and 83 were detained in the EAC region. This is one step forward in regional maritime security 
governance and is one of the most important requirements of the 2050 AIMS. 
  Table 9: PSC efforts by the KMA and the SUMATRA, 2010–2015 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total 
Kenya 168 258 123 443 446 456 1,894 
Tanzania 29 23 2 0 0 0 54 
EAC 197 281 125 443 446 456 1,948 
Total of IOMoU 5,513 5,550 5,051 5,320 5,575 6,253 33,262 
EAC as % of IOMoU 4% 5% 2% 8% 8% 7% 6% 
 
 Source:  (IOMoU, 2015) 
In recent years, following the escalation of Somalia-based piracy, the world has seen the task of a flag 
state as being to provide security to the commercial vessels flying its flag. This can be regarded as the primary 
obligation of the flag state, but it is increasingly being transferred to ship owners, who are allowed to hire 
privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) on board their ships while transacting in high-risk areas 
(Schmöger, 2004). The IMO has issued general guidelines applicable to PCASP practice in relation to 
embarkation, disembarkation and vessel calling (IMO, 2015). However, the overall management of the practice 
rests with the coastal state in collaboration with the flag state and the port state.  
Both Kenya and Tanzania have strict regulations applicable to armed commercial ships calling at 
regional ports. The regulations are also applicable to a ship that intends to make a transit passage through EAC 
waters while armed. Prior notice is required before a ship can make a call to EAC maritime waters. The 
governance of a ship carrying armed guards is coordinated by the Kenyan and Tanzanian flag state with close 
cooperation from their respective armed forces. Among the important pieces of information required by these 
authorities are: a) authorisation from a flag state that a ship has been allowed to be armed; b) verification from 
the private maritime security companies in relation to adequate training procedures; and c) security clearance/a 
certificate of good conduct from Interpol/the police.  
 
6. Conclusion  
The future of the EAC’s blue economy ambitions depends on how far the Community can strengthen its 
maritime security governance. For various reasons, there have been difficulties in putting regional navies 
together in maritime security governance. These include a lack of national and regional maritime security 
strategies. However, there is a significant hope that the civilian institutions responsible for maritime security, 
such as flag states, might work together despite this. Nonetheless, that would require EAC initiatives to 
strengthen their legal and institutional frameworks in the first place. The EAC’s flag states have many maritime 
security responsibilities in their jurisdictions. The only downside is that they lack enforceability capacity. 
Harmonising the flag states’ jurisdictions and putting them together with the goal of achieving regional maritime 
security governance could be a big push towards enabling security and safety in the EAC’s maritime domain.  
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